

# U.S. Offers Broadened A-Sharing

## McNamara Asks NATO Committee To Study Project

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PARIS, May 31—Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara today proposed to the NATO Defense Ministers a plan whose purpose was described as providing a greater degree of participation in nuclear decisions for America's allies.

McNamara suggested the creation of a select committee of four or five defense ministers that would address itself to two important aspects of the nuclear problem:

1. The search for possible ways of improving and extending Allied participation in the planning and use of nuclear forces, including strategic forces.

2. The search for possible ways for improving communications, taking into account modern technical progress, to ensure speedy consultation concerning any decision to use nuclear forces.

Any measures that the committee approved would then be submitted to higher authority for approval, presumably either to the NATO Foreign Ministers or the Permanent Council of NATO, which in either case would mean, in the last analysis, the NATO governments.

There was no reaction to this idea, since today's session was devoted to previously prepared speeches by several defense ministers, without debate, which will presumably take place Tuesday.

McNamara made no reference to the "common market for defense production" that he had announced as an objective for NATO on arriving here Sunday. He spoke first, after a brief opening statement by NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio, and

was followed by the representatives of Italy, Turkey, West Germany, Greece, Great Britain, the Netherlands and France.

McNamara laid considerable stress on the importance of a potential enemy's intentions as a yardstick for determining the size of the force NATO needs. He implied that he considers the Soviet Union's intentions less belligerent than in the past when he said that the behavior of the U.S.S.R. has changed greatly since the Cuban missile crisis.

But West German Defense Minister Kai-Uwe von Hassel feared that NATO would be making a mistake if it based its defense plans on the theory that Soviet intentions have become less dangerous. He felt that the decisive factor was the offensive capacity that the Soviet Union is maintaining opposite Western Europe, which he felt had not shown any recent diminution.

McNamara, on the contrary, cited a figure of half a million fewer Soviet forces facing

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# U.S. Proposes Wider A-Sharing in NATO

NATO today than two years ago.

British Secretary of Defense Denis Healey seemed preoccupied with reducing the cost of British forces in Germany, where the British feel an unnecessarily large number of troops and unnecessarily large stocks of munitions are being maintained for present conditions.

But McNamara was obviously trying to get America's European allies to spend more, not less, money to build NATO forces up to a point where they can meet the greater mobilizable manpower of the Warsaw Pact group (not its permanently ready forces, which he estimated as 2.7 million men against 3 million for NATO).

Obviously but, some of his hearers felt, not quite convincingly that the amount needed would not really be as great as some of the NATO members feel. NATO, he pointed out, is spending \$19 billion a year for ground forces against \$16 billion by the Warsaw Pact countries. This indicates, he said, either that NATO overestimates the capability of the Warsaw Pact forces or that NATO's money is being inefficiently spent, and therefore not much increment will be necessary if at the same time a more efficient use is made of NATO money.

One way of achieving this result, he seemed to be suggesting, was by greater specialization and division of labor, with each country concentrating on what it can do best.

This sounds to the French like a suggestion that Europe supply the foot soldiers and leave to the United States the monopoly of more sophisticated arms, like nuclear weapons.

The French, as Minister of

the Armies Pierre Messmer indicated in stating his government's views, have a different strategic concept of the present situation from that of the United States. France is for the immediate massive use of nuclear arms at the start of a conflict — or at least, for letting a potential enemy know that this is what will inevitably happen.

The American concept is that of the pause, or graduated response. This means meeting an initial attack by conventional arms with conventional arms, and escalating as necessary until, if efforts to prevent that eventuality fail, the use of atomic weapons becomes inevitable.

McNamara expressed the opinion that it is less a mass attack that is to be feared today—in this the French would agree with him—than such factors as renewed threats to Berlin, pressure on the NATO flanks or disorders in Eastern Europe that might create difficulties for NATO countries. However, certain other countries that would be in the front lines in case of invasion share some of the French ideas, notably Germany.

This may partly account for the announcement a few hours before this NATO meeting opened that France will not participate this year in the biennial Fallex maneuvers, the most important of NATO exercises. Its timing may have been intended partly to dramatize for Germany her danger if the American estimate of the nature of the threat should prove wrong, at the moment when Chancellor Erhard is visiting the United States, and one week before President de Gaulle is due to visit him.